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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has come to changes in the 2014 Commentary on Article 17 for artistes
and sportsmen. It did not want to delete the article from the Model Tax Convention, although it used false reasoning to support this decision. In the
mean time, major sports events (Olympics, World Cup Football) and states such as the Netherlands do not use the source taxation anymore, taking
away the risk of excessive or even double taxation for artistes and sportsmen.
But still the OECD has recognized that many artistes and sportsmen are having problems with the source taxation. In the 2014
Commentary it recommends some exceptions, such as an exemption for groups with employees, a minimum threshold, as in the US Model Tax
Convention, and the deduction of expenses. In addition, some states also limit the scope of Article 17(2) to only abusive situations. At the end of the
article, the author gives a revised Article 17 with all exceptions included.
1 2014 UPDATE OF THE OECD MODEL TAX
CONVENTION
On 15 July 2014 the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has published the
latest update of its Model Tax Convention with much
text about Article 17 for artistes and sportsmen.1 The
changes for Article 17 mainly come from the 2010
Discussion Draft,2 but also from the reactions on the
following public consultation. The text of Article 17 itself
has remained unchanged,3 but the Commentary has
doubled in size with clarifications and gives (new) options
to restrict the scope of the article. The author discusses the
problems arising from Article 17, how the changes and
(new) options from the Commentary can lead to solutions
for performers and gives a new text proposal for Article 17
with the options included.
2 HISTORY OF ARTICLE 17
FOR ENTERTAINERS AND SPORTSPERSONS
The special tax rules for international performers first
appeared publicly in 1959 in the second report prepared
by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) and were carried over to the OECD Draft (1963)
with the argument that there were ‘practical difficulties’
when applying the normal taxing rules of Article 7 (com-
panies and self-employed) and Article 15 (employees) to
this specific group of taxpayers. Article 17 was extended
in OECD Model 1977 with the addition of a second
paragraph, stating that, when another person (not the
performer himself) receives the remuneration for the per-
formance, the country of performance still holds the right
to tax the income. This gave countries an extra option to
tax a ‘star company’, which was often set up by top
artistes and sportsmen in tax havens. The new paragraph
was an additional measure to counter tax avoidance.
More concerns appeared in a 1987 OECD Report,4
which recommended that the scope of the ‘star company’
provision would be extended to all legal entities receiving
fees for artistic and sports performances. This was taken
over in the Commentary on the next version of the OECD
Model (1992). This means that not only the income of the
individual performer, but also the profits of every separate
legal entity receiving income for the performance are
taxable in the country of performance, regardless of
whether the performer is the owner or a shareholder or
otherwise has any profit-sharing in the company. This
reversal in the Commentary removed any possibility to
escape from source taxation on performance income. Three
Notes
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1 2014 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention, OECD 15 July 2014.
2 Discussion Draft on the Application of Art. 17 (Artistes and Sportsmen) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, OECD 23 Apr. 2010.
3 Besides the change from ‘artists’ to ‘entertainers’ and ‘sportsmen’ tot ‘sportspersons’.
4 OECD, Taxation of Entertainers, Artistes and Sportsmen, Issues in International Taxation No. 2 (1987).
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countries, Canada, Switzerland and the United States,
disagree with this reversal.5
The 1987 OECD Report also discussed the compu-
tation of the taxable income in the performance coun-
try. OECD Members had brought forward that it was
problematic to calculate the profit when performers
were only staying for a short period of time in their
country, which brought the OECD to the recommen-
dation that countries can tax the gross income without
deductions for expenses, but then should use a lower
tax rate.6
3 PROBLEMS FOLLOWING FROM ARTICLE 17
Article 17 has been taken over in almost any bilateral tax
treaty, not only from OECD Member States but also from
other countries. But unfortunately, this special allocation
rule also increases the risk of practical problems. Two
regular examples of international excessive taxation are
set out below:
Example 1: A Dutch pool billiard player becomes
third in a tournament in Poland and receives EUR
8,000 prize money. His direct travel and lodging
expenses are EUR 900 and his indirect material, coach-
ing and overhead expenses are (allocated) EUR 2,600,
leading to a profit on this Polish tournament of EUR
4,500:
– The Polish withholding tax is 20% from the gross = EUR
1.600.
– Back in the Netherlands the Dutch tax on the
profit = EUR 850.
– The foreign tax credit will not be higher than the Dutch
tax, which means that EUR 1.600 – 850 = EUR 750
excessive taxation remains.
Example 2: A German orchestra performs in Spain,
earning EUR 30.000. The Spanish non-domestic with-
holding tax is 20% from gross. The direct and indirect
expenses are 70% of the costs, i.e. EUR 21.000, leading to
a profit of EUR 9.000. The average German income tax
rate for the musicians is 35%.
Spanish withholding tax: 20% x EUR 30.000 = EUR
6.000
German tax credit (max): 35% x EUR 9.000 = EUR
3.150
——
International excessive taxation = EUR 2.850
In addition, it is very often difficult to obtain the tax
credit in the residence country, such as because the Polish
or Spanish tax certificate might be missing, the German
orchestra might be exempted from corporation tax and
cannot obtain a tax credit, and the musicians are on a
monthly payroll and the foreign tax cannot be converted
into individual tax credits. These difficulties arise easily,
which means that then the excessive taxation goes over in
double taxation, as full tax is paid in both the country of
performance and the residence country.
In practice, this creates much administrative work,
both in the performance country where the organizer of
the performance is responsible for the withholding of the
tax and in the residence country where the artiste or
sportsmen has to apply for the foreign tax credit. Also
the tax authorities in both countries are involved and have
to audit whether the tax filings have been correct. This
administrative work is especially high because artistes and
sportsmen are very often performing in many different
countries during a year, most often only for a short period
of time.
4 UNILATERAL EXEMPTION
IN THE NETHERLANDS, SAME APPROACH
IN TAX TREATY POLICY
The Netherlands have taken away these problems in 2007
with a unilateral tax exemption for non-resident perfor-
mers residing in a country with which the Netherlands
have concluded a bilateral tax treaty.7 This covers many
performers, because the Netherlands have ninety-four
bilateral tax treaties. Interesting is that in all these treaties
a clause comparable to Article 17 OECD Model has been
inserted, but the Netherlands have decided to make use of
the wording ‘may tax’, which does not make source taxa-
tion obligatory but optional. Reasons for this radical
change are that the government wanted to reduce the
administrative burden, the tax revenue from non-resident
performers was very low and the government wanted to
take away the risk of double taxation. With the unilateral
exemption at source the performers only have to pay tax in
their residence country, where the Dutch income has to be
reported in the worldwide income. With the credit
method in the Dutch tax treaties8, these countries do
not have to allow a foreign tax credit and can tax the
income with only their national tax.
Opposite however, the Dutch artistes and sportsmen
performing abroad cannot make use of this exemption,
Notes
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because of Article 17 in the Dutch bilateral tax treaties,
which most treaty partners use to the full extent. They
suffer from the problems described in section 3 of this
article. But the Dutch government gave them a glimpse
of hope with the Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid (Dutch Tax
Treaty Policy), which was published on 11 February
2011. This acknowledged the problems of performers
and expressed the new policy that the Netherlands does
not want to include Article 17 anymore in new tax
treaties. The Netherlands succeeded since then to keep
Article 17 out of only one new treaty, with Ethiopia, but
it was not able to leave it out of the new tax treaty with
Germany, as neighbour country very important for the
Dutch performers. The next tests will be the new tax
treaties with Belgium and Spain, for which talks are
taking place at the moment.
5 TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR MAJOR SPORTS
EVENTS
Over the last years the sports world has become active
against the double taxation and administrative burden
resulting from Article 17. At the 2000 Olympics in
Sydney all participating athletes had to file an
Australian income tax return, reporting every income
connected with the Olympics, regardless where it had
been earned. The tax revenue might have been some
compensation for Australia for the costs of the
Olympics, but the administrative work was enormous,
both for the athletes and their advisers as for the tax
authorities in Australia and in the countries of the ath-
letes, and was too high compared to the tax revenue. That
was enough for the IOC and for the 2010 Winter
Olympics in Vancouver it has agreed with Canada to
delete its non-resident taxation for the participating ath-
letes in the event. Normally, Canada has a 15% with-
holding tax for non-resident sportspersons, with the right
to file a normal income tax return after the year, but these
rules were set aside for the 2010 Winter Olympics.
The same happened with the 2012 Olympics in London,
for which the UK removed its 20% source tax unilaterally9
and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia.10 Also
without source tax were the UEFA Champions League
finals in 2011 and 2013 in London, in 2012 in Munich,
in 2014 in Lisbon and in 2015 in Berlin, the UEFA Europe
League finals in 2011 in Dublin, 2012 in Bucharest, 2013
in Amsterdam, in 2014 in Turin and in 2015 in Warsaw,
EURO 2012 in Poland and Ukraine,11 the 2014 World
Cup in Brazil,12 the 2011 World Cup Cricket in India, the
2011 World Cup Rugby in New Zealand, the 2013
Diamond League in London and the 2014
Commonwealth Games in Glasgow.13 The same will hap-
pen will the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro14 and EURO
2016 in France.15
It shows that the sports world is not waiting for changes
in bilateral tax treaties, but that it forces with the power of
the major sports events that the organizing countries delete
the source taxation for the sportspersons temporarily to
avoid the problems resulting from Article 17.
6 DELETION OF ARTICLE 17 REMAINS
THE BEST SOLUTION
Why would there be ‘practical difficulties’ in a treaty
situation between two countries? In the two examples
from section 3, the Netherlands and Germany as residence
countries could easily be able to tax the foreign perfor-
mance income under Article 7 and 15(2) of the treaties
with Poland and Spain. Which practical obstacles would
there be specifically for performers and not for other
taxpayers?
But after discussion since 201016, the OECD has
decided not to delete Article 17. In part 5 of the OECD
Report ‘Issues related to Article 17 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention’17 it was noted that, despite the explanation
from the Netherlands why it had decided to leave out the
special tax treatment of artistes and sportsmen from
source tax, a vast majority of the OECD Member States
wanted to keep the article. During the discussion, three
reasons were given, which will be discussed below:
(1) ‘Residence taxation should not be assumed given the
difficulties of obtaining the relevant information’: an
invalid argument, because almost every country has
a withholding tax on any monies leaving the
Notes
9 See K. Tetlak, The Taxpayer as the Unofficial Sponsor of the London 2012 Olympic Games, 13(1) Intl. Sports L.J. 97–103 (Mar. 2013).
10 See K. Tetlak, Sochi 2014 Olympic Tax Legislation, 54 Eur. Taxn. 4 (2014), Journals IBFD.
11 See K. Tetlak & D. Molenaar, Tax Exemptions for Euro 2012 in Poland and Ukraine, 52 Eur. Taxn. 6 (2012).
12 See P. Paraguay & B.M. Santo, The Tax Treatment of Income Derived by Participants in the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, Global Sports Law and Taxation Reports, 2014/1.
13 See K. Tetlak, UK Tax Breaks for the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, 54 Eur. Taxn. 5 (2014).
14 See B.M. Santo & L. Lucon, The Tax Benefits Brought by the Brazilian Government for Implementation of the 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games 2016, Global Sports Law
and Taxation Reports, 2015/3.
15 See K. Tetlak, The French Tax Dumping for Sports Mega-Events: Fiscal Exemption for UEFA EURO 2016 and Beyond, Global Sports Law and Taxation Reports, 2015/1.
16 At the 64th IFA Congress in Rome in 2010 the IFA/OECD seminar was devoted to taxation of entertainers and sportspersons under the title ‘Red Card Article 17?’. See the
article D. Molenaar, M. Tenore & R. Vann, Red Card Article 17?, 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 3 (2012).
17 This OECD Report was published on 26 June 2014, three weeks before the 2014 Update of the OECD Model Income Tax Convention.
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country, only allowing an exemption at source when
a bilateral tax treaty explicitly mentions this. When
the tax administration in the residence country also
needs to undersign the application form, it also has
the information about the foreign which needs to be
reported in the income tax return. Therefore, gath-
ering the information can run parallel with the
exemption procedure.
(2) ‘Article 17 allows taxation of a number of high-
income earners who can easily move their residence
to low-tax jurisdictions’: Article 17 is not necessary
for this purpose. When every country has a with-
holding tax for non-residents, which will only be
exempted in a treaty situation, the move to tax havens
will be counteracted perfectly. Unless when countries
decide to conclude tax treaties with tax havens, but
that should then be their choice from which the
performers should not become the victims.
(3) ‘Source taxation of the income covered by the article
can be administered relatively easily’: a strange argu-
ment, because the examples from section 3 show
that the administrative expenses following from
Article 17 are high, involving the performers, orga-
nizers of the performances and the tax authorities in
both the performance and residence country. It
might be easy for the tax collection in the perfor-
mance country, but it is unfair for the performers.
Altogether, the OECD has come with false reasoning to
defend Article 17. This means that the problems of exces-
sive and very often double taxation remain for interna-
tional artistes and sportsmen. That is disappointing,
because Article 17 in its current form is superfluous and
counterproductive and deletion is still the best solution.
7 OPTIONS TO RESTRICT THE SCOPE
OF ARTICLE 17
The OECD did not leave it with this refusal, but came
with proposals to restrict the scope of Article 17. The
following options are now mentioned in the Commentary,
with which a part of the problems can be taken away:
7.1 Article 17 Only for Self-Employed,
Normal Rules from Article 15
for Employees
This first option is mentioned in §2 of the Commentary,
which says that too strict provisions might in certain cases
impede cultural exchanges. To avoid this, countries can
decide in their bilateral tax treaty to restrict paragraph 1 of
the article to business activities. To achieve this it would be
sufficient to replace the words ‘notwithstanding the provi-
sions of Article 15’ by ‘subject to the provisions of Article 15’
in paragraphs 1 and 2. In such a case, employed entertainers
and sportspersons would fall under Article 15 and can be
entitled to the exemption following from Article 15(2). This
restriction was widely used in old German and Swiss tax
treaties in the 1950s and 1960s, in which the special rule for
sportspersons (and entertainers) only referred to self-
employed and not to employees.
7.2 Deduction of Expenses, Normal Tax
Settlements
The second option is mentioned in §10 of the
Commentary, which is the choice between (1) taxation
of the gross performance fee but a low tax rate, and (2) the
deduction of expenses and taxation under the normal
rules. European Union (EU) Member States do not have
this choice and have to follow the second route after the
decisions of the ECJ in the Gerritse, Scorpio and Centro
Equestre cases.18 This means that they don’t have include
this restriction in their bilateral tax treaties, but still can
do it to be clear about their intentions.
The text proposal from §10, however, may not be
sufficient for EU Member States, because it seems to
allow only a refund after the year, while the ECJ clearly
decided in the Scorpio case that directly linked expenses
should be deductible already at the moment of the per-
formance. The deduction of expenses can make an enor-
mous difference19 and it will be an obstacle when this can
only be effective after the year because of the cash flow
disadvantage and the uncertainty about the tax refund.
7.3 De-Minimis-Rule of 15.000 IMF SDR
The third option is new in §10.1 to 10.4 of the
Commentary, which is a minimum amount of 15,000
IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR) per performer per
year, under which the performance country does not have
the right to tax the performance income. This has been
taken over from Article 16 of the 2006 US Model Tax
Convention, which mentions the amount of USD 20,000.
This minimum works very well to keep small and medium-
size performers outside the scope of the source taxation in
the performance country and take away their tax problems,
if they reside in a treaty country. The 15,000 IMF SDR is
currently equivalent to approx. EUR 20.000.
Notes
18 ECJ, 12 June 2003, C-234/01, Arnoud Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord; ECJ, 3 Oct. 2006, C-290/04, FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH v. Finanzamt Hamburg-
Eimsbüttel; ECJ 15 Feb. 2007, C-345/04, Centro Equestre da Leziria Grande Lda v. Bundesamt für Finanzen.
19 D. Molenaar, Taxation of International Performing Artistes (IBFD 2006).
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Furthermore, the 15,000 IMF SDR is not a fixed
amount for the OECD but just an example. Countries
can also include another fixed amount in their treaty or
can even use a dynamic definition with which the amount
can be adjusted yearly. For such a dynamic definition the
OECD gives the example in §10.2 that the yearly amount
can be determined by a formula such as ‘50 per cent of the
average GDP per capita for OECD countries, as deter-
mined by the OECD’. This average Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) for OECD countries was USD 38,867 in
2014, which means that the threshold could be set at 50%
= USD 19,434 for e.g. 2016.20 This is comparable to the
USD 20,000 which the US Model Income Tax
Convention is using.
But it is very different from the USD 20,000 which the
United States introduced back in 1996 and is using since
then. The average GDP for OECD countries was USD
20,960 in 1996, which means that the United States had
set the de-minimis-amount then at the level of the OECD
average GDP for that year. Following this, it would be
very reasonable not to use 50% of the average GDP but
100% of the average GDP for OECD countries as the
dynamic definition in Article 17(1). This would be USD
38,867 per 1 January 201621 as the minimum threshold.
A crucial element is whether this de-minimis-rule can be
used directly at the performance. The Technical
Explanation with Article 16 of the 2006 US Model dis-
cusses that there may arise problems when an entertainer
or sportsperson exceeds the minimum during the year.
Therefore, it can be agreed that tax needs to be withheld
during the year, which can be refunded after the year
when the minimum has not been exceeded. But the
United States has this refund provision in only 17% of
its bilateral tax treaties, while in the other 83% the direct
method applies. Now §10.3 of the new Commentary on
the OECD Model also mentions this possibility.
Unfortunately, this refund obligation would make the
de-minimis-rule less effective than the direct method.
Refunds after the year are an obstacle for cross-border
work, so the direct method should be used.
7.4 Support from Public Funds
(Also for Non-Profits and Cultural
and Sports Exchange?)
The fourth option excludes performances supported from
public funds from Article 17(1) and (2). This exception is
since 1977 specified in §14 of the Commentary with the
argument that cultural exchanges and subsidized
entertainers and sportspersons could suffer from the far-
reaching impact of the article. Nowadays, two-third of the
bilateral tax treaties have an Article 17(3) clause with this
exemption and for some countries almost every tax treaty
has an Article 17(3)22, which means that it is a part of the
tax treaty policy of many countries.23 Especially subsi-
dized artistes (and groups) are using this exemption fre-
quently, but it does not seem to be very helpful for
sportsmen (and teams) because are not so often subsidized.
Quite some tax treaties have specified Article 17(3) in
a different manner, such as for non-profit organizations
and cultural programs and exchanges. These exceptions
have the same objective, to take away the problems that
follow from too strict provisions of Articles 17(1) and (2)
for those entertainers and sportspersons that are not in
the risk category of tax avoidance. This could be taken
over in §14 of the Commentary and even in the text of
Article 17.
7.5 Foreign Teams and Groups
The fifth option is new in §14.1 of the Commentary on
Article 17 and is an exemption for foreign teams and
groups working with performers as employees. There is
an overlap with the first option in §2 of the Commentary,
which I have discussed in paragraph 6.1, but §14.1 makes
clear that some countries want a narrower exemption than
completely removing all employees from Article 17. As
example, §14.1 gives a text proposal in which the exemp-
tion is only available for cross-border competitions. This
has been taken over from Article XVI(3) of the treaty
between Canada and the United States, which helps the
joint hockey, football, baseball and basketball competi-
tions to eliminate tax problems.
This looks promising for European competitions with
many cross-border matches, such as in football with the
Champions and Europe League, but the UEFA does not
need this provision, because it has organized itself that the
problems from Article 17 do not occur. The home teams
keep the box office earnings and do not share these, while
the broadcasting and advertisement fees are paid from
Switzerland as royalties, on which the Swiss tax treaties
under Article 12 normally do not levy a source tax. Also
the new §9.4 of the 2014 Update to the OECD Model
specifies that these earnings do not fall under Article 17.
Only the box office earnings of the CL and El finals are
shared by the participating teams, but for these finals the
UEFA forces the country of the final to grant a tax
exemption, as shown in section 5 of this article.
Notes
20 Which was EUR 17.889 and GBP 13.152 at the exchange rates of Jan. 2016.
21 This would go more in the direction of the de-minimis-amount of USD100,00, which was proposed by Daniel Sandler in 2007 in Source Versus Residence: Problems Arising from the
Allocation of Taxing Rights in Tax Treaty Law and Possible Alternatives (M. Lang ed., Wolters Kluwer 2008 & Taxmann 2008).
22 Examples are Hungary, China, Slovenia, Indonesia and Turkey.
23 D. Molenaar, Article 17(3) for Artistes and Sportsmen: Much More than an Exception, 40(4) Intertax 270 (2012).
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It might be that this fifth option from the Commentary
is interesting for other sports, but to make it effective all
the countries of the teams participating in the cross-
border competition should include this exception in
their tax treaties to make is effective. This is in Europe
much more complicated than with Canada and the United
States.
7.6 Limited Approach of Article 17(2) Still
in §16 of the Commentary
Remarkable is that §16 of the old Commentary on Article
17 of the OECD Model is not discussed in the 2014
Update, but is still mentioned in the new Commentary.
In this Reservation, Canada, Switzerland and the United
States express their opinion that Article 17(2) should only
be used in abusive situations as mentioned in §11.2(c) of
the Commentary, which is when the entertainer or sports-
person is the owner of the legal person that receives the
performance income, as initially meant with the introduc-
tion in 1977. Many tax treaties of Canada, the United
States, Switzerland and some other countries contain a
restriction which leads to a limited use of Article 17(2).
This is very practical to avoid problems resulting from
Article 17, such as example 2 in section 3 of this article.
8 NEW TEXT OF ARTICLE 17 AFTER
THE 2014 UPDATE
When the six options are brought together in a new
Article 17, this will lead to the following text. With
this, Article 17 remains within the lines of the
Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention:
Article 17 – Entertainers and Sportspersons
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 7, but
subject to the provisions of Article 15, income
derived by a resident of a Contracting State as an
entertainer, such as a theatre, motion picture, radio
or television artiste, or a musician, or as a sports-
person, from his personal activities as such exercised
in the other Contracting State, may be taxed in that
other State, unless when the gross amount of such
income derived by that resident from these activities
exercised during a taxation year of the other
Contracting State does not exceed (50% of) the
average GDP per capita for OECD countries, as
determined by the OECD, or the equivalent
expressed in the currency of that other State at the
beginning of that taxation year.
1. Where income in respect of personal activities exer-
cised by an entertainer or a sportsman in his capacity
as such accrues not to the entertainer or sportsman
himself but to another person, that income may,
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 7, be
taxed in the Contracting State in which the activ-
ities of the entertainer or sportsman are exercised,
unless when the entertainer or sportsperson estab-
lishes that neither he, nor any person associated with
him or related to him, participates directly or indir-
ectly in the profits of the person referred to in that
paragraph.
2. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply
to income derived from activities performed in a
Contracting State by entertainers or sportspersons
if the visit to that State is wholly or mainly sup-
ported by public funds of one or both of the
Contracting States or political subdivisions or local
authorities thereof, or when the person which
receives the income for the performing entertainers
or sportspersons is a non-profit organizations or
when the activities take place as part of a cultural
or sports program, if this non-profit organization or
cultural or sports program is recognized by the
Contracting States in a mutual agreement procedure.
In these cases, the income is taxable only in the
Contracting State in which the entertainer or the
sportsperson is a resident.
3. Where a resident of a Contracting State derives
income referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 and such
income is taxable in the other Contracting State on
a gross basis, that person may, before the activities
take place or afterwards within three years after the
taxable year in which the activities have taken place,
request the other State in writing that the income be
taxable on a net basis in that other State. Such
request shall be allowed by that other State. In
determining the taxable income of such resident in
the other State, there shall be allowed as deductions
those expenses deductible under the domestic laws
of the other State which are incurred for the pur-
poses of the activities exercised in the other State
and which are available to a resident of the other
State exercising the same or similar activities under
the same or similar conditions.
(2) The provisions of Article 17 shall not apply to
income derived by a resident of a Contracting State
in respect of personal activities of an individual
exercised in the other Contracting State as a sports-
person member of a team of the first-mentioned
State that takes part in a match organized in the
other State by a league to which that team belongs.
9 OTHER CHANGES IN THE COMMENTARY
ON ARTICLE 17
There are also other changes in the Commentary on
Article 17, besides the six options to restrict the article.
Altogether the size of the Commentary has been doubled
with clarifications, practical examples and positions of the
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Member States and observers to the OECD. The following
changes are relevant:
(1) Who is an artiste/entertainer: §3 now gives examples of
persons not acting as entertainers, such as a former
politician speaking on a conference and a model
presenting clothes on a fashion show or in a photo
session.24
(2) Sponsoring and endorsement: §9 states that income
which is directly connected with a performance,
but is earned outside the country, may also be
taxed in the performance country. This addition is
a direct result of the Agassi25 case in the UK and the
Goosen26 and Garcia27 cases in the United States, in
which the sponsor and endorsement income of this
tennis player resp. these two golf players as far as
they were directly connected to the performances in
the country were allocated to that country and taxed.
The fact that both the sportsman and the sponsor
had their residence abroad did not make a difference
for this use of the territoriality principle.
(3) Merchandising: §9 also allocates the sale of merchan-
dise around performances to Article 17. There has
been some discussion with bigger pop concerts
about this subject and for many bands this is inter-
esting extra income. Only when there is no direct
relationship between the performance and the sale of
the merchandise, the income will fall outside the
scope of Article 17.
(4) Preparation, rehearsals en training: §9.1 clarifies that
preparation, rehearsals en training also fall under
the activities of the performers, which means that
the income from this is also taxable in the country
of the activities, even when no public performance
would take place there. This is an interesting
addition, because most often the country in
which these preparations, rehearsals or trainings
sessions take place most often don’t know any-
thing about this income, because no payments
are done in that country, such as salaries of foot-
ball players and orchestra musicians. This is no
problem when the credit method is used to elim-
inate double taxation in the residence country, but
leads to double non-taxation when the exemption
method applies.28
(5) Radio, TV and other media: §9.4 mentions that the
payments to an entertainer or sportsperson for the
broadcast of his performance on radio, TV and other
media also falls under Article 17.29 However, when
the payment is done to a third party and the enter-
tainer or sportsperson does not receive a direct pay-
ment for his activities, the income does not fall
under Article 17. §9.4 gives the example of a foot-
ball tournament, from which the organizer holds the
rights and receives the income, after which pay-
ments are done to the football teams. This does
not fall under Article 17, according to the new
Commentary, which is interesting, because there is
a clear connection between the performances of the
football teams and the income and under Article 17
(2) this would be taxable in the performance coun-
try. But this seems too harsh for the OECD,
although this unlimited approach hits many others
in the arts and sports world. However, the lobby of
the UEFA and FIFA seems to have worked very well
and they have succeeded to keep their finances also
for the OECD outside the scope of Article 17. But it
is unfair when compared with other sports teams,
orchestras, music ensembles and theatre and dance
groups, which are taxable for every income they
receive from their performances.
(6) Image rights: §9.5 discusses ‘image rights’ of enter-
tainers en sportspersons. The OECD holds the opi-
nion that also these earnings fall within the scope of
Article 17, when there is a direct link to
performances.
(7) Owner of a race horse or race team: §11.2 states that the
prize money for the owner of a race horse or a race
team falls outside Article 17. The OECD believes
that this prize money is used for the training and
development of the horse resp. the design, manufac-
turing and preparation of the race car and not for the
activities of the jockey or the race driver. Only when
the owner receives income specifically for the jockey
or the race driver, this will be taxable for the owner.
Unfortunately, this is also unfair – same as with
§9.4, because also for other sports teams, orchestras,
music ensembles and theatre and dance groups most
of the performance income is not meant for the
payments to the performers, but stays with the
team or group to pay the creation and other direct
Notes
24 In the Positions at the end of the new Commentary on Art. 17, Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, China and India have made clear that they think differently about these
examples, mostly about models, and prefer to include them in Art. 17.
25 UK: HL, 17 May 2006, Agassi v. Robinson (2006) UKHL 23.
26 US: TC, 9 June 2011, Goosen v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 27.
27 US: TC, 14 Mar. 2013, Garcia v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 6.
28 See R. Betten, Netherlands Ice Skater not Eligible for Relief for Foreign Training Days, 45 Eur. Taxn. 6 (2005).
29 This can also be found in §18 of the Commentary on Art. 12 OECD Model Tax Convention.
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and indirect expenses. But they fall under Article 17
(2), even for their profit element. The approach of
the OECD in §11.2 is therefore inconsistent.
10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The 2014 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention
has much text about Article 17 for artistes and sports-
men. After the 2010 Discussion Draft, the OECD has
considered the deletion of the article, which was advo-
cated by the Netherlands, but the Member States have
decided to keep it. With incorrect arguments, but it
seems that the Member States did not want to follow
the example of the Netherlands and many major sports
events to return to the normal allocation rules.
Unfortunately, this means that the tax problems will
remain for performers, which lead to excessive or even
double taxation and relatively high administrative
expenses.
The best option will still be not to include Article 17 at all
in new tax treaties, because the normal allocation rules of
Article 7 (and 14) and Article 15 are sufficient to counteract
tax avoidance. But the withholding tax in the country of
performance should then only be exempted after an applica-
tion procedure in which also the tax authorities of the resi-
dence country would undersign the application form and
therewith receive the information about the foreign income.
The OECD has decided not to delete Article 17, but to
give six (new) options in the 2014 Update to restrict the
scope of the article. With these options a new, lengthy
Article 17 is possible, which countries can include in their
new tax treaties and still remain within the official OECD
lines. When used to the full extent many performers can
apply for an exemption at source and avoid excessive or
double taxation. Hopefully, countries will start to use
these options actively in their tax treaty negotiations and
support their artistes and sportsmen with a modern and
better defined Article 17.
NEW OPTIONS TO RESTRICT ARTICLE 17 FOR ARTISTES AND SPORTSMEN
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